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One of the central issues in welfare economics is the measurement of overall wellbeing 
and, to this end, the interaction between institutions (polity) and growth is paramount. 
Individual welfare depends on both economic and political factors but the continuous 
nature of economic variables combined with the discrete nature of political ones 
renders conventional multivariate techniques problematic. In this paper, we propose a 
multivariate dominance test based on the comparison of mixtures of continuous and 
discrete distributions to examine changes in welfare. Our results suggest that, while 
economic growth exerted a positive impact from 1960 to 2000, declines in polity over 
the earlier part of this period were sufficient to produce a decline in overall wellbeing 
until the mid-1970s. Subsequent increases in polity then reversed the trend and, 
ultimately, wellbeing in 2000 was higher than that in 1960. To be sure, economic and 
political variables are correlated and the dominance of polity in our multivariate results 
is consistent with the conjecture that this correlation is predominantly due to a causal 
link from polity to growth. While the development literature is rife with debates over 
whether it is institutions that cause growth or growth that causes institutions, we argue 
that the  relevant question is not which hypothesis is correct but, rather,  which 
hypothesis dominates. Since standard regression techniques have difficulty capturing 
non-linear dependence, especially when one of the variables is an index with limited 
variation, we propose a causality dominance test to examine this aspect of the growth-
institutions nexus and indeed find evidence that the causal effects of polity on growth 
dominate those of growth on polity, particularly when the data are population weighted. 
1 
 1.  Introduction 
 
The interaction between institutions and economic outcomes is a key issue in both welfare and 
development economics. While welfarists are more concerned with intra-temporal interactions 
between these variables, namely the extent to which they contribute to overall wellbeing, 
development economics has focused extensively on inter-temporal interactions between them, 
namely causality.  In this paper, we argue that standard techniques are ill-suited for these 
questions and, instead, propose a dominance-based approach to address them. 
 
There is no doubt that both political freedoms and material advancement promote welfare but the 
discrete nature of political variables combined with the continuous nature of economic ones 
encumbers the assessment of welfare changes. With respect to dynamic relationships, a positive 
correlation between institutions and economic outcomes has been readily established but 
causality has proven more contentious. Even theoretically, causality can run in both directions. 
To the extent that better institutions such as property rights, political freedoms, and government 
accountability provide better investment incentives, they can be expected to encourage economic 
activity. At the same time though, prolonged economic failure may compel agents to demand 
better institutions and any growth that makes them richer or more educated might also provide 
the extra bargaining power needed to make these demands credibly.
1   
 
On the empirical front, a key study that finds causality from institutions to economic outcomes is 
Acemoglu et al (2001). They argue that the institutions introduced by European colonizers varied 
according to their settlement objectives and show that the persistence of these institutions to the 
present day has had important income per capita implications for the ex-colonies. Using a growth 
                                                 
1 Additional linkages are discussed in Sen (1999) and Friedman (2005). 
2 
 accounting framework, Hall and Jones (1999) also argue for the primacy of institutions, finding 
that differences in social infrastructure help explain the large differences in capital accumulation 
and productivity that we observe across countries. More recent work by Gwartney et al (2006) 
confirms the importance of such an institutions-investment channel while Dawson (2003) 
identifies freedoms related to international finance as those which affect growth through 
investment and freedoms related to political, civil, and economic liberties as those which affect 
growth directly. Consistent with Calderon and Chong (2000) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), 
however, both Dawson (2003) and Gwartney et al (2006) also find evidence of reverse causality 
when certain institutional measures are used. The importance of disaggregating institutions is 
further established by the Heckelman (2000) result that an average measure of freedom along 
with its monetary, capital, and property rights components precedes growth but that growth 
likely precedes the extent of government intervention. A consistent conclusion is reached by 
Alvarez and Vega (2003) who find clear evidence of causality from institutions to growth when 
institutions are measured as economic freedoms but confounded evidence when they are 
measured as political freedoms. 
 
Similar debates have also emerged in the financial development literature. Beck et al (2000), for 
example, argue that legal and accounting institutions are particularly important for an economy’s 
growth because they determine the sophistication of its financial intermediaries. The results of 
King and Levine (1993) also suggest that the pre-determined component of financial 
development is a good predictor of long-term growth while Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that 
sectors in need of external finance develop more quickly in economies with better financial 
markets. Morris et al (2001), on the other hand, find evidence of reverse causality in some 
OECD countries and two-way causality in others but no decisive evidence that the link between 
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 financial development and economic performance runs strictly from the former to the latter. 
Using a Geweke decomposition to test for linear feedback between financial deepening and 
growth rather than the unidirectional Granger procedure typically employed, Calderon and Liu 
(2003) also find that causality runs in both directions with financial systems exerting a larger 
effect on growth in developing countries. 
 
That the debate is far from settled is also reflected in several papers which have raised questions 
about the econometric methods used to investigate the relationship between growth and 
institutions. Levine and Renelt (1992), for example, demonstrate that slight changes in the list of 
explanatory variables can overturn the results of many empirical growth studies while De Haan 
et al (2006) also criticize the specification of certain growth models used in the literature. 
Perhaps the most searing criticism though is provided by Glaeser et al (2004) who argue that 
traditional methods for testing the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes are 
flawed and, once proper measures and valid instruments are employed, institutions only have a 
second-order effect on economic performance. The task of interpreting the literature is further 
complicated by the Doucouliagos (2005) finding of a publication bias towards the conclusion 
that economic freedoms have a positive impact on growth, suggesting that the lack of consensus 
may be even more pronounced than it appears. 
 
In light of the preceding discussion, we abstract from conventional regression methods and 
analyze the relationship between institutions (polity) and economic outcomes in the context of 
inter-temporal dependence rather than just inter-temporal correlation. Given theoretical support 
for both the “polity causes growth” and “growth causes polity” hypotheses, we argue that they 
should not be treated as alternatives and instead focus on identifying the dominant hypothesis by 
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 adapting the overlap index proposed by Anderson et al (2009a, 2009b) for use with a mixture of 
discrete (polity) and continuous (growth) variables. The basic premise is that the joint density of 
two independent variables overlaps the product of their marginal densities at every point of 
support so, if institutions do indeed determine economic outcomes more than economic 
outcomes determine institutions, the joint density of earlier institutions and later outcomes 
should be systematically further away from independence than that of earlier outcomes and later 
institutions. Using this approach, we can admit non-linear relationships non-parametrically and 
bypass the error-term constraints that plague regression methods.
2 Dominance-based techniques 
are also germane because they are what we use to examine the other important aspect of the 
polity-growth interaction: the effect on overall welfare. Changes in economic and political 
variables have not always been in the same direction, making their net impact on wellbeing 
difficult to ascertain. Drawing from the multivariate stochastic dominance literature, however, 
we can compare the current distribution over growth-polity pairs to past distributions over these 
pairs and make qualitative statements about the progress of wellbeing. 
 
The next section presents our methodology in more detail. Section 3 then discusses the data used 
while Section 4 reports our results. We find that economic growth exerted a positive impact on 
wellbeing from 1960 to 2000. Declines in polity over the earlier part of this period, however, 
were sufficient to produce a decline in overall wellbeing until the mid-1970s. Subsequent 
increases in polity then reversed the trend and, ultimately, wellbeing in 2000 was higher than that 
                                                 
2 Further evidence of non-linearity in the development literature is provided by the Anand and Ravallion (1993) 
finding that GDP per capita loses its explanatory power for life expectancy when incomes of the poor are added as a 
separate variable. In addition to inflexibility in dealing with non-linear relationships, traditional regressions also 
have problems finding non-controversial instruments to address joint causality as well as problems dealing with 
mixtures of discrete and continuous variables. 
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 in 1960. We also find evidence that the causal effects of polity on growth dominate those of 
growth on polity, particularly when the data are population weighted. 
  
2.  Methodology 
 
Multivariate Wellbeing 
With some modification, the multivariate stochastic dominance techniques presented in 
Anderson (2008) and Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006) can be used to assess changes in overall 
wellbeing. Although these techniques do not provide a complete ordering of states, when they do 
provide a ranking, the ordering is unambiguous. Suppose societal wellbeing in period t can be 
written as U(yt,xt): a monotonic, non-decreasing function of the continuous variable economic 
wellbeing (yt) and the discrete variable political freedoms (xt). Further, let yt and xt be jointly 
distributed with potentially time-varying PDF gt(y,x) and corresponding CDF Gt(y,x). If D = 
Gt(y,x)-Gt-i(y,x) ≤ 0 for all pairs (y,x) with strict inequality for at least some, then E(U(yt,xt)) ≥ 
E(U(yt-i,xt-i))and, based on Atkinson and Bourguing (1982), the society at t can be considered a 
welfare improvement over the society at t-i for all wellbeing functions in the monotonic non-
decreasing family. In fact, as long as D is significantly negative for some pairs (y,x) and not 
significantly positive for all other pairs, E(U(yt,xt)) ≥ E(U(yt-i,xt-i)) can be established and an 
approximately first order welfare improvement obtains. 
 
In order to make quantitative statements about D, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for 
differences between distributions. The statistic is based on the maximum value of D over the 
support of the two distributions being compared and an estimate of this value can be obtained 
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 from sample-based estimates of the joint densities in two periods.
3 The formula used for   
P(√n*D < λ) is 1-exp(-2λ
2)
  which is Rayleigh’s formula for the univariate statistic (K=1). 
Although Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1958) establish the existence of a distribution function for D 
when K>1, they find that it generally depends on G. Later work by Kiefer (1961), however, 
suggests that the formula for the univariate case provides a conservative (i.e. larger) estimate of 
the true value when K>1. 
 
Causality Dominance 
Let x be an n-dimensional vector and fa(x) and fb(x) be two continuous multivariate distributions. 
The extent to which fa(x) and fb(x) overlap can be measured as: 




In recent work, Anderson, Linton, and Whang (2009b) show that the kernel estimator of               
θ = ∫min{fa(x),fb(x)}dx is distributed as follows:  
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3 Although the joint distribution of polity and growth describes a mixture of discrete and continuous variables, this 
does not pose a problem since sample cumulants are easily calculated. 
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 The slight wrinkle for the polity-growth application, however, is that x is a mixture of discrete 
and continuous variables. Denoting them by xd and xc respectively so that x = (xd, xc), the 
appropriate overlap measure is: 
                                          () () {} min ,
d
mix a b c
x




The discrete version of OV has been developed in Anderson, Ge, and Leo (2009a) so the 
properties of OVmix can be derived as a mixture of the two cases. Moreover, OVmix lends itself 
quite naturally to a measure of dependence. To see how, let yt be a vector of economic variables 
in period t with joint distribution f(yt) and xt be a vector of institutional indices in period t with 
joint density p(xt). The joint distribution of economic outcomes in period j and institutions in 
period k is denoted by g(yj,xk). Under independence, g(yj,xk) = f(yj)p(xk) and the following 
measure of their dependence can be constructed: 
() ( ) ( ) () { } () ,1 m i n , , 0
k j
jk jk j k j
x y
dyx gyx fy px d y =− ∈, 1 ∑ ∫  
A greater degree of dependence between yj and xk implies less overlap between g(yj,xk) and 
f(yj)p(xk), leading to higher values of d(yj,xk). To test for causality dominance, we thus focus on     
d(yt-i,xt)-d(yt,xt-i) for i=1,…,n. Consistently negative differences support the hypothesis that 
institutions promote growth more than growth promotes institutions while consistently positive 
differences support the reverse. Essentially, conditions like d(yt-i,xt)-d(yt,xt-i) ≥ 0 for all i or      
d(yt-i,xt)-d(yt,xt-i) ≤ 0 for all i are forms of dominance relationships and establishing them 
empirically would lend considerable support to one view or the other. Since these inequalities 
need to hold simultaneously, the simultaneous comparison techniques in Wolak (1989) and 
Stoline and Ury (1979) are appropriate. 
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 3.  Data 
 
We consider a sample of 84 developed and developing countries over the period 1960 to 2000 
and draw data on institutional quality and economic outcomes at 5 year intervals. A detailed 
description of the data is provided in Appendix I. Of all the standard measures of institutions, 
Glaeser et al (2004) suggest that constraints on the executive is the most defensible so we use the 
corresponding variable from the frequently cited Polity IV project.
4 We also use data on GDP 
per capita from the World Bank Development Indicators database to measure economic 
outcomes. 
 
At this point, it is useful to address the often overlooked issue of population weighting. If the 
polity-growth nexus is viewed as a latent technological relationship, each country should be 
interpreted as a particular draw from that technology and given equal weight. If, on the other 
hand, we take a representative agent view, country-level observations should be population 
weighted so as to give each individual in the world sample equal weight. In what follows, we 
present the results of both approaches as well as a representative agent version that excludes the 
two most populous countries – China and India. 
 
Summary statistics are reported in Tables 1a and 1b. When unweighted, average GDP per capita 
exhibited sustained growth throughout the period. Average polity, in contrast, declined over the 
first 15 years of our sample, returning to its initial level in the mid-1980s and rising to 
unprecedented levels thereafter. The 1980s also saw a reversal in the plight of the poorest nation 
with minimum GDP per capita transitioning from consistent improvements to substantial losses 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Hanson (2004), Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), and Klomp and De Haan (2009). 
Acemoglu et al (2001) also use the Polity IV data in their robustness checks. 
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 late in the decade. With regard to dispersion, polity and GDP per capita seem to be driven by 
very different processes. Polity, in particular, appears to be a convergent measure whereas GDP 
per capita appears to be a divergent one. The population weighted statistics tell a similar story for 
the polity variable but not for GDP per capita which is characterized by greater dispersion and 
substantially lower means and medians. 
 
4.  Results 
 
Multivariate Wellbeing 
Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c report the Kolmogorov-Smirnov first order stochastic dominance 
comparisons for all possible pairs of years in the sample. The joint densities have been estimated 
using cumulants of the Epechinokov kernel in the continuous dimension and straightforward 
cumulation in the discrete dimension. An increase in overall wellbeing from year B to year A is 
declared if “H0: Year A dominates Year B” is accepted and “H0: Year B dominates Year A” is 
rejected. If both hypotheses are rejected or both hypotheses are accepted, an indeterminate 
change in welfare is reported. 
 
In this application, the unweighted results are the clearest – out of the 36 possible year-to-year 
comparisons, the unweighted sample yields only 5 indeterminacies while the weighted samples 
with and without China and India yield 20 and 10 respectively. The unweighted results reflect 
the fact that declines in polity between 1960 and 1975 outweighed progress in incomes, leading 
to declines in overall wellbeing relative to initial conditions. By 1985, however, the drop in 
polity had been made up and further progress in such institutions meant that unambiguous 
increases in wellbeing were sustained through to 2000. The population weighted results tell a 
10 
 consistent story, particularly when China and India are excluded from the sample. In the latter 
case, the main difference relative to Table 2a is that a swifter recovery in polity under population 





To avoid difficulties with joint density estimation at points with too few observations, we 
amalgamate polity categories 1 and 2 and polity categories 3 and 4 to form a new five-point 
polity scale. For all lags examined – 0 to 40 years in 5 year intervals – the dependence of GDP 
on past polity and the dependence of polity on past GDP are readily established. With causality 
in both directions, we now turn to the question of interest: does one direction dominate in the 
sense that the degree of dependence is always at least as great in that direction at every lag? 
Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c report the causality dominance results for the unweighted, population 
weighted, and population weighted excluding China and India data. We have used a discrete–
continuous specification for the joint densities, employing a Gaussian kernel for the continuous 
component and Silverman’s rule of thumb for the window width.
5  
 
With respect to the unweighted results, there is some indication that the causal nature of polity 
dominates that of GDP per capita but the differences are largely insignificant. The weighted 
results, on the other hand, exhibit a stronger level of dependency in all cases and a clearer 
pattern. At all lags where d(yt-i,xt)-d(yt,xt-i)<0, the hypothesis that the dependence of current 
outcomes on past institutions outweighs the dependence of current institutions on past outcomes 
is accepted under modest degrees of significance. In contrast, the reverse hypothesis is readily 
                                                 
5 Silverman (1986) suggests a window width of 1.06σn
-1/(4+k). 
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 rejected at all lags where d(yt-i,xt)-d(yt,xt-i)>0. As previously noted, population weighting assigns 
extraordinary importance to the circumstances of China and India. If these countries are omitted 
from the weighted sample, the conclusion that “polity causes growth” dominates “growth causes 
polity” emerges more strongly.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
There has been considerable debate over whether it is institutions that cause growth or growth 
that causes institutions and the discussion has, at least in part, been fomented by the fact that the 
two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In this paper, we argue that the relevant question is 
not which hypothesis is correct but, rather, which hypothesis dominates. Since conventional 
regression techniques have difficulty capturing non-linear dependence, especially when one of 
the variables is an index with limited variation, we propose a causality dominance test based on 
the overlap measure of Anderson et al (2009a, 2009b) to examine the growth-institutions nexus. 
When the data are not weighted by population size, consistent with a technological interpretation 
of the model, the results are inconclusive. In contrast, when a representative agent view is taken 
and the data are population weighted, we find evidence that institutions cause economic 
outcomes to a greater extent than economic outcomes cause institutions, particularly when China 
and India are excluded from the calculus. Another advantage of a dominance-based approach is 
its natural link to multivariate welfare comparisons. Our results on this front suggest that, while 
economic growth has had a positive impact on wellbeing over the past 40 years, early declines in 
polity were sufficient to produce a decline in overall welfare until the mid-1970s. Subsequent 
increases in polity then reversed the trend and, ultimately, wellbeing in 2000 was higher than that 
in 1960.
12 
 Table 1a: Summary Statistics, Unweighted Sample 
 
  Polity Index  GDP per Capita 










 4.0595       3       2.3865     7      1  
 3.9048       3       2.4079     7      1  
 3.5476       3       2.3867     7      1  
 3.4881       3       2.4909     7      1  
 3.7024       3       2.4971     7      1  
 4.0238       3       2.4690     7      1  
 4.6071       5       2.3593     7      1  
 5.0238       6       2.1055     7      1  
 5.2381       6       1.8860     7      1 
 2.8340    0.9360    3.8138    18.7110    0.0990  
 3.4042    1.0250    4.6036    21.8770    0.1000  
 4.1108    1.2265    5.4884    25.1250    0.1220  
 4.7011    1.4135    6.1152    25.5950    0.1400  
 5.2871    1.5490    6.9372    28.2060    0.1400  
 5.6276    1.4660    7.6299    29.6870    0.1530  
 6.2496    1.5100    8.6665    33.3690    0.1320  
 6.7504    1.6780    9.2308    35.4390    0.0560  




Table 1b: Summary Statistics, Population Weighted Sample 
 
  Polity Index  GDP per Capita 










 4.3159       3        2.4045  
 4.1409       3        2.4693  
 3.9913       3        2.4946  
 3.7311       2        2.3118 
 4.3024       3        2.3210 
 4.5155       3        2.2116 
 4.6626       3        2.1532 
 4.8433       5        2.0778 
 5.1097       6        1.8967   
    2.6032           0.1880            4.3386 
    3.0737           0.1930            5.1541 
    3.6255           0.2280            6.0631 
    3.9241           0.2200            6.6360 
    4.3216           0.2500            7.4917 
    4.6062           0.2820            8.1715 
    5.0420           0.3730            9.2744 
    5.3339           0.5960            9.6872  
    5.8958           0.8440          10.6937 
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B               A 




P(A dominates B) 
 
P(B dominates A) 
1960        1965 
1960        1970 
1960        1975 
1960        1980 
1960        1985 
1960        1990 
1960        1995 
1960        2000 
1965        1970 
1965        1975 
1965        1980 
1965        1985 
1965        1990 
1965        1995 
1965        2000 
1970        1975 
1970        1980 
1970        1985 
1970        1990 
1970        1995 
1970        2000 
1975        1980 
1975        1985 
1975        1990 
1975        1995 
1975        2000 
1980        1985 
1980        1990 
1980        1995 
1980        2000 
1985        1990 
1985        1995 
1985        2000 
1990        1995 
1990        2000 





































    0.026095697  
    0.097916794  
    0.20874747  
    0.0082932073  
    0.023747494  
    0.51823675  
    0.82367753  
    0.91784705  
    0.031452497  
    0.12376443  
    0.044379124  
    0.10601742  
    0.62963214  
    0.91564586  
    0.97356939  
    0.048017103  
    0.11957484  
    0.38634246  
    0.90266393  
    0.98590375  
    0.99679388  
    0.11010568  
    0.46673230  
    0.87021908  
    0.98095379  
    0.99526916  
    0.19299481  
    0.75971296  
    0.95623359  
    0.98800982  
    0.44568735  
    0.84905464  
    0.94348564  
    0.30718239  
    0.55811598  
    0.16173100 
      0.11850338  
      0.51465297  
      0.60711409  
      0.47699463  
      0.11571586  
     0.019935707  
  5.7875176e-007  
    0.0059285395  
      0.26554788  
      0.45588410  
      0.31831677  
     0.026537624  
    0.0061565362  
  1.6200814e-007  
   0.00062529422  
      0.13007599  
     0.058384074  
     0.017977451  
    0.0056174308  
  8.7398894e-006  
  2.2803319e-006  
  1.0208946e-008  
   0.00071125766  
  7.7727105e-005  
  3.5621253e-005  
  2.1558126e-006  
    0.0013534198  
  7.4649073e-005  
  1.0352316e-006  
  6.4344415e-005  
  5.7465243e-007  
  2.1653034e-006  
  6.8788149e-005  
  5.1650570e-006  
  2.6561361e-008  
     0.056415134 
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B               A 




P(A dominates B) 
 
P(B dominates A) 
1960        1965 
1960        1970 
1960        1975 
1960        1980 
1960        1985 
1960        1990 
1960        1995 
1960        2000 
1965        1970 
1965        1975 
1965        1980 
1965        1985 
1965        1990 
1965        1995 
1965        2000 
1970        1975 
1970        1980 
1970        1985 
1970        1990 
1970        1995 
1970        2000 
1975        1980 
1975        1985 
1975        1990 
1975        1995 
1975        2000 
1980        1985 
1980        1990 
1980        1995 
1980        2000 
1985        1990 
1985        1995 
1985        2000 
1990        1995 
1990        2000 





































     0.012311067  
     0.016197666  
   0.00090649030  
     0.059709774  
     0.062985155  
      0.11624084  
      0.69358022  
      0.55154715  
     0.035547872  
     0.011977133  
     0.041373940  
      0.11601445  
      0.24593613  
      0.68335991  
      0.67281329  
  6.6152341e-006  
     0.099397583  
      0.32242648  
      0.45951041  
      0.91483171  
      0.89461235  
      0.22337623  
      0.51059764  
      0.66370882  
      0.97629449  
      0.96875965  
      0.13344319  
      0.26213185  
      0.64443631  
      0.68587293  
     0.030367266  
      0.58521921  
      0.75671521  
      0.38950613  
      0.69725946  
      0.34233381 
      0.10479906  
      0.36370992  
      0.86721410  
      0.69177442  
      0.79529069  
      0.95983110  
      0.76415276  
      0.95972809  
      0.20920414  
      0.83354021  
      0.42731053  
      0.64891922  
      0.94230165  
      0.76361940  
      0.95025659  
      0.55386816  
      0.15205695  
      0.48926328  
      0.90200906  
      0.61934480  
      0.89305615  
     0.047758204  
      0.33271108  
      0.83829950  
      0.48470411  
      0.81907182  
      0.15206811  
      0.31874794  
  2.1820664e-006  
  1.3710790e-005  
     0.049145457  
  3.0951799e-006  
  2.1950087e-005  
  3.4595414e-007  
     0.035595225  
    0.0017220562 
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B               A 




P(A dominates B) 
 
P(B dominates A) 
1960        1965 
1960        1970 
1960        1975 
1960        1980 
1960        1985 
1960        1990 
1960        1995 
1960        2000 
1965        1970 
1965        1975 
1965        1980 
1965        1985 
1965        1990 
1965        1995 
1965        2000 
1970        1975 
1970        1980 
1970        1985 
1970        1990 
1970        1995 
1970        2000 
1975        1980 
1975        1985 
1975        1990 
1975        1995 
1975        2000 
1980        1985 
1980        1990 
1980        1995 
1980        2000 
1985        1990 
1985        1995 
1985        2000 
1990        1995 
1990        2000 





































     0.063238664  
      0.20254125  
      0.26718915  
    0.0074026734  
     0.047936564  
      0.51987356  
      0.69308651  
      0.85077586  
      0.11239711  
     0.087104918  
     0.099218213  
      0.35005223  
      0.62676388  
      0.82788121  
      0.96331337  
    0.0076207032  
     0.010915308  
      0.41551074  
      0.68134139  
      0.89700057  
      0.98747463  
     0.054535959  
      0.58623719  
      0.79959322  
      0.95917695  
      0.98987974  
      0.40807978  
      0.66971880  
      0.91247128  
      0.98321602  
      0.10522856  
      0.56006106  
      0.87632965  
      0.23469919  
      0.80855281  
      0.61916063 
      0.39408100  
      0.63036076  
      0.81810162  
      0.77089334  
      0.26337816  
      0.13901535  
   0.00014329966  
     0.039237850  
      0.26011478  
      0.50830041  
      0.43648797  
     0.096537349  
     0.045879373  
  5.9325521e-005  
    0.0015408809  
     0.085633244  
     0.063602252  
     0.041262914  
     0.015871029  
   0.00018287109  
  1.8514816e-006  
    0.0014700837  
   0.00029843225  
     0.034869126  
   0.00020264293  
  3.0430335e-005  
   0.00043506019  
  1.3204289e-006  
  7.1326197e-006  
  5.0665324e-005  
  8.7281870e-007  
  1.1273375e-005  
  7.9859118e-005  
   0.00013157124  
  3.5060235e-006  
     0.056347152 
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             No Bias Adjustment                                     Bias Adjusted 
d(yt-i,xt)   d(yt,xt-i)   “t(diff)”   P(T>"t")    d(yt-I,xt)   d(yt,xt-i)   “t(diff)”   P(T>"t") 
0  0.4282     0.4291    -0.0139    0.4945        0.1485    0.2465     -0.9296    0.1763 
5  0.4256     0.4342    -0.1943    0.4230        0.1754    0.2397     -0.8672    0.1929 
10  0.4207     0.4216    -0.0235    0.4906        0.2043    0.2390     -0.5769    0.2820 
15  0.4200     0.4162     0.1251    0.5498         0.2260    0.2411     -0.2855   0.3876 
20  0.4286     0.4145     0.5233    0.6996         0.2482    0.2486     -0.0066   0.4974 
25  0.4299     0.4203     0.3850    0.6499         0.2631    0.2597      0.0790   0.5315 
30  0.4254     0.4237     0.0766    0.5305         0.2674    0.2699     -0.0606   0.4758 
35  0.4169     0.4135     0.1730    0.5687         0.2671    0.2666      0.0126   0.5050 








             No Bias Adjustment                                 Bias Adjusted 
d(yt-i,xt)   d(yt,xt-i)   “t(diff)”   P(T>"t")    d(yt-I,xt)   d(yt,xt-i)   “t(diff)”   P(T>"t") 
0  0.4608     0.4443     0.2787    0.6098        0.2765    0.3087     -0.3026    0.3811  
5  0.4509     0.4582    -0.1665    0.4339        0.2983    0.3312     -0.4411    0.3296  
10  0.4346     0.4682    -0.9411    0.1733        0.2890    0.3595     -1.1777    0.1195  
15  0.4434     0.4640    -0.6857    0.2464        0.3125    0.3560     -0.8374    0.2012  
20  0.4492     0.4709    -0.8188    0.2064        0.3343    0.3730     -0.8418    0.2000  
25  0.4562     0.4757    -0.8129    0.2081        0.3533    0.3854     -0.7642    0.2224  
30  0.4636     0.4601     0.1601    0.5636        0.3702    0.3747     -0.1159    0.4539  
35  0.4584     0.4542     0.2129    0.5843        0.3705    0.3708     -0.0101    0.4960  








             No Bias Adjustment                                 Bias Adjusted 
d(yt-i,xt)   d(yt,xt-i)   “t(diff)”   P(T>"t")    d(yt-i,xt)   d(yt,xt-i)   “t(diff)”   P(T>"t") 
0  0.4748     0.4724     0.0410    0.5163        0.3364    0.3458     -0.0873    0.4652  
5  0.4554     0.4784    -0.5301    0.2980        0.3278    0.3798     -0.6922    0.2444 
10  0.4436     0.4890    -1.2918    0.0982        0.3165    0.4005     -1.3924    0.0819 
15  0.4454     0.4879    -1.4217    0.0776        0.3321    0.3961     -1.2303    0.1093 
20  0.4546     0.4940    -1.4913    0.0679        0.3529    0.4053     -1.1296    0.1293 
25  0.4629     0.4923    -1.2363    0.1082        0.3682    0.4058     -0.8906    0.1866 
30  0.4713     0.4761    -0.2247    0.4111        0.3840    0.3940     -0.2550    0.3994 
35  0.4663     0.4673    -0.0541    0.4784        0.3841    0.3888     -0.1271    0.4494  
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•  Constraints on the executive measured on a scale of 1 to 7. Higher values reflect better 
institutions with 1 representing unlimited authority and 7 executive subordination. 
 
•  Data from Polity IV Project (www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm). See Jaggers and 
Marshall (2007) for a description. 
 
•  The Polity IV dataset does not report measures of executive constraints for transition years. 
This was an issue for a few of the observations used here and, to circumvent it, the closest 





•  Real GDP per capita measured in thousands of constant 2000 US$. 
 










•  The following were chosen based on data availability for the period 1960–2000: 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Brazzaville, 
Congo Kinshasa, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Tunisia, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.  
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